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Kevin Burke is one of the success stories of the judiciary.  A judge foralmost 20 years, he retains his zeal and commitment to public service.In addition, he is the master of intelligent innovation.  As chief judge
of the state trial courts in Minneapolis, in recent years he has brought social
scientists into the court to study things like the effects of judicial demeanor on
impressions of fairness in the court; previously, he was one of the early pioneers
in the drug-court movement.  Burke’s record of service led to his receipt of the
2003 William H. Rehnquist Award for Judicial Excellence, the highest award
given to a state-court judge by the National Center for State Courts.
We begin this issue by reprinting Burke’s
remarks at the Rehnquist Award ceremony.
Burke tries to identify the key ingredients
needed to let a court fulfill its promise to the
public.  His list includes fairness and respect,
listening and understanding, and accountabil-
ity.  We think you’ll find his comments of inter-
est.  We invite your response, either via a letter
to the editor or a responsive essay.
Researchers Robyn Robertson and Herb
Simpson of the Traffic Injury Research
Foundation present the findings of a survey of
more than 900 judges on impediments to effec-
tive sanctioning of drunk drivers.  Their article reviews both the views of
judges and a summary of some of the existing research related to these prob-
lem areas.  Take a look at what other judges think about the problem areas,
then let us know if your experience suggests some effective solutions.  Again,
letters to the editor are welcome here.
We close the issue with Professor Charles Whitebread’s annual survey of the
past year’s criminal decisions of the United States Supreme Court.  Although
there were no landmark decisions, it is always helpful to have a quick review
of the most recent decisions.
I will close this column with a note about a coming event and special issue
of Court Review.  As part of the American Judges Association’s annual confer-
ence this October in San Francisco, we will present a National Forum on
Judicial Independence.  This forum will be unique because it will focus on
threats to judicial independence at the trial-court level.  In advance of the con-
ference, we will devote a special issue of Court Review to the topic.  We hope
you’ll consider attending the conference (see the inside back cover for details)
and will help us in our consideration of issues affecting judicial independence
in the trial court. —SL
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited,
original articles, essays, and book reviews.  Court Review
seeks to provide practical, useful information to the
working judges of the United States, Canada, and Mexico.
In each issue, we hope to provide information that will be
of use to judges in their everyday work, whether in high-
lighting new procedures or methods of trial, court, or
case management, providing substantive information
regarding an area of law likely to encountered by many
judges, or by providing background information (such as
psychology or other social science research) that can be
used by judges in their work.  Guidelines for the submis-
sion of manuscripts for Court Review are set forth on page
26 of this issue.  Court Review reserves the right to edit,
condense, or reject material submitted for publication.
Court Review is in full text on LEXIS and is indexed in the
Current Law Index, the Legal Resource Index, and
LegalTrac.
Letters to the Editor, intended for publication, are wel-
come.  Please send such letters to Court Review’s editor:
Judge Steve Leben, 100 North Kansas Avenue, Olathe,
Kansas 66061, e-mail address:  sleben@ix.netcom.com.
Comments and suggestions for the publication, not
intended for publication, also are welcome.
Advertising: Court Review accepts advertising for prod-
ucts and services of interest to judges. For information,
contact Deloris Gager at (757) 259-1864.
Photo credit:  Mary S. Watkins (maryswatkinsphoto
@earthlink.net).  The cover photo is of the Kearney
County Courthouse. Built in 1906 in Minden, Nebraska,
its 100-foot dome is a landmark visible for miles.
© 2004, American Judges Association, printed in the
United States.  Court Review is published quarterly by the
American Judges Association (AJA). AJA members
receive a subscription to Court Review. Non-member sub-
scriptions are available for $35 per volume (four issues
per volume).  Subscriptions are terminable at the end of
any volume upon notice given to the publisher.  Prices are
subject to change without notice.  Second-class postage
paid at Williamsburg, Virginia, and additional mailing
offices.  Address all correspondence about subscriptions,
undeliverable copies, and change of address to
Association Services, National Center for State Courts,
Williamsburg, Virginia 23185-4147.  Points of view or
opinions expressed in Court Review are those of the
authors and do not necessarily represent the positions of
the National Center for State Courts or the American
Judges Association.  ISSN: 0011-0647.
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As I wrote this, the National Center for State Courts had just
completed the Eighth Court Technology Conference (CTC8) in
Kansas City, Missouri. I was fortunate to be able to participate in
CTC8 as your president and as a local host. My thoughts about
CTC8 follow several lines of analysis, one about the role of tech-
nology in our courts, another about the impact of the National
Center, and a third about the international nature of technology. 
These were to be the primary subjects of this column until
Roger Warren, president of the National Center, announced his
resignation, effective summer 2004, at the National Center’s
board meeting in Washington, DC last November. This former
California Superior Court judge from Sacramento has
served with distinction and energy for the past eight
years at the National Center, even though he commit-
ted to only five years of service when he moved his
family east to Williamsburg, Virginia. 
My involvement with the National Center had
been limited until last year, when I made four separate
trips to Williamsburg representing the AJA, as a par-
ticipant on a panel on impaired driving and as your president.
Each time I’ve been there, I’ve been impressed with the profes-
sionalism and expertise of the Center’s staff in all departments.
The universal attitude demonstrated by the employees I’ve
encountered has been positive, friendly, and efficient. These val-
ues ultimately flow from only two sources—the individuals who
work at the Center and their leader, Roger Warren. Even exem-
plary employees will eventually cut corners and settle for less if
the leadership allows it. It’s clear to me that Roger Warren set an
example that didn’t allow that to happen. Best wishes and good
luck to you, Roger, in whatever challenges you pursue in the
future. 
The role of the National Center is a fitting topic for examina-
tion by the AJA. We, as an organization, rely on the Center’s staff
for research, advice, and administrative services, all of which are
provided to the AJA at a cost that is not market-based. If we had
to pay for these services “a la carte,” we would not be able to
remain in business. So, the National Center is a critical partner
with the AJA.  The AJA can never surrender its independence to
another organization and our relationship with the National
Center allows the AJA to maintain its ability to chart its own
course for the benefit of its members. When the AJA participates
in National Center events, as we did at CTC8, we get the benefit
of the Center’s cutting-edge involvement in technology without
expending the enormous resources it would take to produce a
similar program ourselves. The AJA’s relationship with the
National Center remains strong and will continue to grow under
its new leadership.
About CTC8: it was a success with 97 vendors
and 2,300 attendees from around the world. Judges,
court administrators, and vendors came from 48
states and 30 nations on 5 continents. It was truly an
international event. The AJA extended membership
to every judge who attended CTC8 who was not
already an AJA member. Also, every vendor at CTC8
was approached about displaying its products and
services at the next AJA annual conference in San Francisco this
October. These are contacts and connections that will prove to be
invaluable in the future. 
CTC8 did one more thing: it revealed to this non-technolog-
ically inclined judge that we, as judges, will be forever dependent
upon technology, and blessed or cursed by it in ways that our
judicial ancestors could not imagine. Issues of privacy, access,
and judicial independence will become more common as execu-
tive-department computer programmers and legislative-branch
budget experts and allied professionals will treat the judiciary as
just another client, no different from the water department, the
election commission, or the zoning board. It will be necessary to
remind them that we represent the third branch of government
and as such are to be accorded a much different status. There will
be battles in the future to be fought along these lines. Some have
already begun. The AJA needs to be in the forefront of this con-
flict, working on behalf of all judges. 
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President’s Column
Michael R. McAdam
Editor’s Note:  These remarks, edited for
publication, were given by Judge Kevin S.
Burke on November 20, 2003 in the Great
Hall of the Supreme Court, in ceremonies
during which he received the 2003 William
H. Rehnquist Award for Judicial Excellence.
The father of modern judicial admin-istration, Professor Roscoe Pound,identified timeless tensions we face,
including widespread misunderstanding
of, and dissatisfaction with, the courts as
well as with the other branches of gov-
ernment.  A generation ago, Pound gave a
famous speech entitled “The Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice.”  Pound spoke
of many things that contributed to the
dissatisfaction he perceived during his
time.  While there have been enormous
improvements in the structure of the
administration of justice, a generation
later we have not met the fundamental
challenge of reducing the causes of popu-
lar dissatisfaction with justice.    
Today the dissatisfaction with the
administration of justice is at a level that
none of us should tolerate or accept, for
it threatens our democracy as much or
more than any terrorist.  The nation’s dis-
satisfaction with the administration of
justice is our issue of homeland security.
In Pound’s speech, he spoke first of the
popular assumption that the administra-
tion of justice is an easy task to which
anyone is competent.  The fact that I am
the recipient of the Rehnquist Award
proves to many that Pound was correct.
Pound said a second factor that con-
tributed to the dissatisfaction was the
political jealousy that the other branches
of government have with the judiciary
due to the doctrine that courts have the
final say in what the constitutional law is
in our nation.  Today it is fair to say that
too many of our colleagues in the execu-
tive and legislative branches have many
of the jealousies of their predecessors.
Unfortunately, some political leaders are
too easily prone to speak of judicial
tyranny when there is mere disagreement
with the outcome of a case.  
Pound identified a third cause of dis-
satisfaction that he described as the
sporting theory of justice.  The sporting
theory of justice is the view that essen-
tially the legal process is two modern
gladiators in a pitted war, with the role of
the judge to be simply a referee for the
combat.  Even today the sporting theory
of justice is so rooted in the legal profes-
sion in America that many of us take it
for a fundamental legal tenet.  Pound
argued that the sporting theory of justice
disfigures our judicial administration at
every point.  It leads the most conscien-
tious judge to feel that he or she is merely
to decide the contest, as attorneys present
it, according to the rules of the game, and
not to search independently for truth and
justice.  It leads attorneys to forget that
they are officers of the court and to deal
with the rules of law and procedure
exactly as the professional football coach
deals with the rules of the sport. 
All of us—in the courts and the com-
munity at large—pay the price for misun-
derstandings about the courts.  While I
believe that there is far more trust and
satisfaction with the court system than
many of our critics would lead you to
believe, it’s easy to feel a bit under siege at
times.  We need to maintain perspective.
Our nation has always been critical of the
judiciary.  Chief Justice Marshall, who
today is revered, was nearly impeached in
an effort fostered by Thomas Jefferson.
Marshall, not having the benefit of a
court public information officer, was
forced to respond to critics by writing a
series of letters to the editor in his own
defense, using a pseudonym.  Nearly a
century later, President Theodore
Roosevelt, upset with a ruling from the
Supreme Court, said of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes that he could carve out
of a banana a judge with more backbone
than the backbone of Oliver Wendell
Holmes.  Billboards populated the nation
demanding the impeachment of Chief
Justice Earl Warren.  Former President
Ford at one time wanted to impeach
Justice William Douglas. Despite—and
perhaps because of—criticism, the judi-
ciary continues to thrive, change, and, I
am hopeful, improve. 
A factor that contributes to our gener-
ation’s cause of popular dissatisfaction
with the administration of justice is the
way we conduct public debate on the
issues of our time.  Regrettably, too often
the current method of policy disagree-
ment is to take the other guy’s idea, mis-
characterize it, and announce your pro-
found disagreement and outrage.
Moreover, not only is our political
rhetoric divisive, our nation is divided as
well, which also contributes to the diffi-
culty we have in responding effectively to
the popular dissatisfaction with the
administration of justice.  The social his-
torian Gertrude Himelfeld described us
as “one nation, two cultures,” one more
religious, traditional, and patriotic, the
other more secular, tolerant, and multi-
cultural.  It should be no surprise that a
polarized nation is also conflicted when it
comes to a vision for what the justice sys-
tem should look like.  
Learned Hand articulated a vision of
justice and liberty that—despite our
healthy and legitimate differences about
how justice should be delivered—calls to
mind some of our highest aspirations.
On May 21, 1944, when the world faced
many of the same kinds of challenges we
face today, he asked: 
What, then, is the spirit of lib-
erty? I cannot define it; I can only
tell you my own faith: 
• The spirit of liberty is the spirit
that is not too sure that it is
right; 
• The spirit of liberty is the spirit
which seeks to understand the
minds of other men and women; 
• The spirit of liberty is the spirit
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Kevin S. Burke
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which weighs their interests
alongside its own without bias. 
When you think about what Hand
said, he called on the best of our human-
ity when judges put on the robe—as
much as he called on our judicial inde-
pendence, our impartiality, and our abil-
ity to apply the law to the facts.  Hand
tried to tap the powers we bring to the
bench, not just those that are attributed to
us on the bench.  If judges and lawyers are
“not too sure we’re right,” we can be far
more creative. 
We can move away from the sporting
theory of justice.  Instead, whether we are
judges, lawyers, or administrators, we
must move from recycling problems
toward resolving them with the best
thinking of the courts and communities.
We need to connect the resources within
our communities, whether the issues are
in drug court, mental health court, family
court, or in how we respond to the issue
of race and diversity.  The courts of the
future require partnerships with the other
helping professions and the public at
large.
I am not so naïve as to expect univer-
sal agreement on the issues that face the
courts.  We will and should have our dis-
agreements on the vision of justice we
each seek.  But we must do so in a man-
ner that fosters public confidence.
Unfortunately, the judiciary and the lead-
ers of the bar are at times contributing to
the popular dissatisfaction with the
administration of justice.  Too often we
forget Hand’s admonition that the spirit
of liberty is the spirit that is not too sure
that it is right.
Morris Udall once said, “God give me
the grace to make my words gentle and
tender, for tomorrow I might eat them.”
In an era when the nation is so divided
and its political leaders and pundits have
an unhealthy tendency toward “gotcha”
rhetoric, those of us affiliated with the
judicial branch must model the behavior
and rhetoric we hope for from the other
branches of government.  There will be
vigorous dissents from appellate courts
and spirited debate by court administra-
tors and court leaders.  Today more than
ever, we must model our behavior and
our debate of the issues that face the
courts so that the other branches learn
from our example.  In the relationship
judges have with court administrators
and employees, we must remember we
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were appointed, perhaps elected, but
never anointed.  The words of Morris
Udall will serve the legal profession well.
The popular dissatisfaction with the
administration of justice is not fueled just
by rhetoric, but by performance.  For
some understandable reasons, courts
have differentiated themselves from the
private sector and its business practices.
We say that courts neither control the
influx of cases nor the laws that create
them, that due process is intrinsically
inefficient, and that the administration of
justice is complex and, therefore, not
amenable to modern management prac-
tices.  The unfortunate consequence of
these and other such arguments is that
most courts can articulate what does not
work, but have not designed quality ini-
tiatives that do work in what is asserted
to be the unique culture of the court.
Our challenge is made more difficult with
the fiscal crisis that confronts too many
state courts.  However, a lack of money is
not an excuse for a lack of ideas.  We
must be willing to innovate if we are to
effectively address the popular dissatis-
faction with the administration of justice.
Barbara Jordan once said, “What the
people want is simple.  They want an
America as good as its promise.’’  The
same can be said of what this nation
wants of its courts.  They want a court—
they want a judiciary—as good as its
promise. 
A court or a judiciary that is as good as
its promise is known not just for speed
and efficiency (heaven knows, we’re good
at that), but also for other, less quantifi-
able aspects of justice—things like fair-
ness and respect, attention to human
equality, a focus on careful listening, and
a demand that people leave our courts
understanding our orders.  Courts cannot
be satisfied with being quick.  Nor can we
be satisfied with being clever.  We must
strive to be fully just to every person who
leaves the courthouse.  
Last year there were nearly 90 million
cases filed in the state courts.  In
Minnesota alone we had nearly two mil-
lion cases.  The volume of work makes
individual attention to justice seem at
times to be an unattainable goal and so
we rest on measuring our speed.  It has
been said that what you measure is what
you care about.  To address the popular
dissatisfaction with the administration of
justice, courts and judges must measure
and be accountable for the fairness of our
actions.  
Most importantly, we need to directly
confront the notion that although judges
at every level must be neutral, neutrality
does not dictate that we mask that we
care.  Litigants and the community must
know that the judges of our country care
about them as individuals.
Several years ago, I sent a young
African-American by the name of Isaac to
prison.  After his release, he was again
convicted of a new drug offense.  One
afternoon I found Isaac outside my cham-
bers.  He was distraught and obviously
angry.  He told me that someone had
taken a shot at his mother.  If you knew
Isaac’s past, you would predict he’d seek
revenge.  Isaac’s mother asked him to go
see me.  She said that she did not want to
see him dead or in prison for the rest of
his life.  We talked and that day Isaac
kept his mother’s wish for him alive.
Isaac did not seek revenge.  Although I
knew Isaac, I never met his mom.
Somehow, however, she thought that the
court was a place that cared.
A few months ago, a young African-
American by the name of Adrian came to
see me.  He told me that he had been
employed for two years, was drug free,
and was living with his girlfriend.  He
wanted to get married, but his girlfriend
said he had to resolve his anger issues
with his mother first.  Adrian had lived
on the streets since he was 13.  His
mother was involved in prostitution and
drugs.  I had no answers for Adrian and
told him so.  He responded that he under-
stood, but what he really wanted to talk
about was not his relationship with his
mother, but the fact that he had a
younger brother who was 13.  Adrian did
not want him to grow up the same way he
did.  He thought he could find the answer
in a conversation with a judge.  Adrian
believed the court was a place that cared.
On my desk I have a creature—an
angel given to me by the mother of a boy
named Christopher.  Christopher was a
little older than Isaac or Adrian.
Christopher was white, middle class, and
a heroin addict.  Christopher’s mom gave
me a note and the creature to thank me
for trying.  Her son had stayed straight
for four months, relapsed, and then died
of an overdose.  His mother thanked me
for giving Christopher back to his family
for those four months.  Even though her
son died and we failed her family,
Christopher’s mom thought that the
court was a place where people cared.
It’s not trite to say that the courts play
an indispensable role in preserving
democracy.  They most definitely do. Any
particular case we hear may not have
great historical effect, but each case is a
crucial human event.  Taken together, the
decisions we make day in and day out
have the potential to affirm the public’s
faith in the strength of democracy—or to
shake that faith. What the people want is
simple.  They want a court—they want a
judiciary—as good as its promise.
Kevin S. Burke is chief
judge of the Hennepin
County District Court in
Minneapolis.  Appointed
to the municipal court
bench in 1984, he
became a general-juris-
diction trial judge by
court merger in 1986.
He received the 2003 William H. Rehnquist
Award for Judicial Excellence from the
National Center for State Courts, having
previously received the National Center’s
Distinguished Service Award in 2002.  The
Rehnquist Award is presented annually to a
single trial judge who exemplifies the high-
est levels of judicial excellence, integrity,
fairness, and professional ethics.  Burke
established the drug court in Minneapolis
and has engaged in detailed studies of court
fairness, including ones exploring what fac-
tors determine whether criminal defendants
and victims believe a proceeding was fair.
He is a 1975 graduate of the University of
Minnesota School of Law, where he is an
adjunct member of the faculty.
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Impaired driving is the most frequently committed crime inAmerica.  It has been an issue of debate and concern for thejudiciary, as courtrooms across the country hear cases
involving a majority of the 1.4 million annual DWI arrests.
Since the early 1980s, concerned citizens have lobbied for and
won considerable changes to the way these cases are
approached from a public-policy perspective, often resulting in
legislative initiatives and changes in criminal practice.  Until
now, however, little comprehensive research has been con-
ducted on the implications of these system-wide changes for
criminal justice professionals.  
In December 2002, the Traffic Injury Research
Foundation—an independent road safety institute—released a
report concerning the adjudication of DWI cases and the sanc-
tioning of hard-core drinking drivers.1 Its findings were based
on the views, insights, and opinions of more than 1,000 judges
across the country.  The report is part of a multiyear research
initiative designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness
of the criminal justice system by highlighting key problems in
each segment of the system and recommending practical, cost-
effective solutions.  Two earlier reports addressed problems in
the detection and apprehension of hard-core drinking drivers,2
and the prosecution of these offenders.3 The foundation
recently released the final report in July 2003, which addressed
monitoring by probation and parole.4
In addition to funding provided by a charitable contribution
from the Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc., the involvement and
participation of several thousand criminal justice professionals
across the United States—representing law enforcement officers,
prosecutors, judges, and probation and parole officers—made
this unique initiative possible.  By identifying key problems and
recommending practical solutions derived from prior research
and validated by the experiences of thousands of professionals
participating in the study, the initiative underscores the need for
systemic improvements.  As a starting point, this series of
reports serves as a valuable sourcebook.  It provides direction to
criminal justice and traffic safety professionals at national and
state levels.  It also guides agencies in addressing concerns and
in strategically reviewing existing policies.  
This research has received considerable support, coopera-
tion, and interest from a wide variety of individuals as well as
key national agencies.  These groups include the Highway Safety
Committee of the International Association of Chiefs of Police,
the National Traffic Law Center of the American Prosecutors’
Research Institute, the National District Attorneys Association,
the National Association of Prosecutor Coordinators, the
Conference of State Court Administrators, the American Judges
Association, the National Judicial College, the National Center
for State Courts, the American Probation and Parole
Association, and the National Criminal Justice Association.  
HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM
Significant reductions in impaired driving occurred during
the 1980s and early 1990s.  However, these declines stagnated
in the mid-1990s.  Today, approximately 40% of highway fatal-
ities are still alcohol related.  The recent increase in the num-
ber of alcohol-related fatalities reported by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration in 2000 and 2002 indi-
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Judicial Report on the
Adjudication and Sanctioning 
of Hard-Core Drinking Drivers
Robyn D. Robertson and Herb M. Simpson
Footnotes
1. Robyn D. Robertson & Herb M. Simpson, DWI System
Improvements for Hard Core Drinking Drivers: Sanctioning, TRAFFIC
INJURY RESEARCH FOUND. (2002), available at http://www.
trafficinjuryresearch.com/publications/PDF_publications/Sanctionin
g_Report.pdf.    
Departments or agencies attempting to address any of these
issues are encouraged to consult the study report.  It contains
extensive and detailed information on the problems identified
and numerous examples, references, and contacts that agencies
can draw upon for guidance.  State-specific information can also
be obtained, when available, upon request to TIRF.  Copies of full
reports and executive summaries for the enforcement, prosecu-
tion, and sanctioning phases can be accessed at www.
trafficinjuryresearch.com or by contacting Barbara Koppe toll-free
at 877-238-5235 or barbarak@trafficinjuryresearch.com.  
2. Herb M. Simpson & Robyn D. Robertson, DWI System
Improvements for Hard Core Drinking Drivers: Enforcement, TRAFFIC
INJURY RESEARCH FOUND. (2001), available at http://www.
trafficinjuryresearch.com/publications/PDF_publications/Enforce
mentReport.pdf.
3. Robyn D. Robertson & Herb M. Simpson, DWI System
Improvements for Hard Core Drinking Drivers: Prosecution, TRAFFIC
INJURY RESEARCH FOUND. (2002), available at http://www.
trafficinjuryresearch.com/publications/PDF_publications/Prosecu
tion_Report.pdf.
4. Robyn D. Robertson & Herb M. Simpson, DWI System
Improvements for Hard Core Drinking Drivers: Monitoring, TRAFFIC
INJURY RESEARCH FOUND. (2003), available at http://www.
trafficinjuryresearch.com/publications/PDF_publications/Monito
ring_Report.pdf. 
cates that progress is now being eroded.5
The high-risk group of drinking drivers—referred to vari-
ously as hard-core drunk drivers, chronic drunk drivers, per-
sistent drinking drivers, or drivers with high blood alcohol
concentrations (BACs)—account for a large portion of the
problem.  Virtually all major government and not-for-profit
agencies in the United States declared this dangerous group of
offenders a national priority.    
For judges, hard-core drinking drivers pose a significant
threat because their alcohol tolerance and persistent behavior
make them more difficult to sanction effectively and deter from
drinking and driving.  Moreover, their familiarity with the jus-
tice system allows them to manipulate the system’s weaknesses
and exploit its loopholes to avoid the appropriate sanction or
conviction altogether.  Of greater concern is the inability of
courts to identify repeat DWI offenders, which is, in part,
attributable to system-wide inconsistencies.  
STUDY APPROACH
The project began with an extensive literature review to
identify problems in the adjudication and sanctioning of repeat
offenders.  From this research, a list of priority problems was
created and used as the basis for discussion in workshops in
five states (Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, and
New York).  These workshops involved 22 limited and general
jurisdiction judges, as well as some with specialized DWI case-
loads, from 19 court jurisdictions.  The goal of these work-
shops was to prioritize key problems identified in the research
literature, gain further understanding of the magnitude and
implications of these problems, and identify practical, cost-
effective solutions supported by judges.
The results from the workshops were used to construct a
nationwide survey to confirm the findings against a wider pop-
ulation and to obtain further information about such things as
the frequency with which various problems are encountered.
With the cooperation and assistance of the Conference of State
Court Administrators, 900 judges from limited and general
jurisdiction courts in 44 states were surveyed, making this one
of the largest judicial surveys completed on DWI adjudication. 
STUDY FINDINGS
The monitoring of offenders to ensure compliance with
court-ordered sanctions and the highly technical and scientific
evidence associated with DWI cases were identified by judges
as primary concerns.  They also reported that overlapping legal
issues and the unprecedented growth in DWI legislation has
made an already complicated system even more complex.  In
order of priority, judges nationwide identified the following
problems:
1. Sentence monitoring;
2. Evidentiary issues;
3. Caseload;
4. Motions and continuances;
5. Failure to appear;
6. Records;
7. Sentencing disparity;
8. Mandatory minimum
sentences; and
9. Juries.
In the remaining sec-
tions of this article, we
present a detailed look at
these top nine problems in
terms of their magnitude,
scope, consequences, and
solutions.
1. Sentence Monitoring  
The public often assumes that once a judge bangs the gavel
and imposes a sentence it is the end of the story—the offender
complies with the terms and conditions of his or her sentence.
However, judges report that noncompliance is common.  Some
of the participating judges estimate that, in their jurisdictions,
40% of offenders never even report to the probation office—
meaning that some of the terms and conditions of sentences
never even begin.  This phenomenon, however, should not be
surprising considering that monitoring is a complex, demand-
ing, and under-resourced task undertaken by multiple agencies.
Generally, several agencies share the responsibility for mon-
itoring offender compliance—probation officers, various treat-
ment and service providers, prosecutors, and courts.  Probation
officers are usually responsible for day-to-day physical moni-
toring of offenders, except in lower courts, where probation
services are frequently nonexistent.  Although probation prac-
tices vary from state to state, probation generally includes
direct contact with offenders as well as gathering information
from related agencies and service providers.  In some states,
officers regularly summarize this information, forwarding it to
the appropriate judge for review and action.  In other states,
officers only produce reports after violations have occurred.  In
jurisdictions without probation services, judges are often
required to ensure compliance.  
In every jurisdiction, irrespective of its particular approach,
judges possess the ultimate authority to ensure compliance.
However, the inability to verify whether an offender completed
his or her sentence makes it difficult for judges to effectively
use their authority.  Almost half of judges (48%) considered the
lack of resources as a significant factor contributing to this
problem.  Other factors include heavy caseloads (43%), the
lack of communication (31%), and inconsistent or delayed
reporting (23%).    
Study findings indicate that many repeat offenders routinely
fail to comply with the terms and conditions of their sentence,
either in whole or in part.  Participating judges estimated that
nationally approximately one-third of repeat offenders are
returned to court for failure to comply with sanctions.
Although this gives little indication of how often noncompli-
ance by offenders is undetected, other findings suggest this
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behavior may be quite preva-
lent.  For example, in
Washington, judges ranked the
monitoring of offenders as a rel-
atively small concern.  There,
judges believed they were better
able to identify noncompliant
offenders—estimating that 45%
of these offenders were
returned to court.  This sug-
gests that noncompliance may
be more prevalent in some jurisdictions than is currently esti-
mated by judges, given the lower percentage nationally for
offenders returned to court for noncompliance.    
The inadequate monitoring of sentences has considerable
consequences.  Despite the development of sentences and strate-
gies that are truly effective, these sanctions will not achieve their
intended goal of changing offender behavior if offenders can suc-
cessfully avoid participation and their non-compliance goes
undetected.  Furthermore, past experience with the justice sys-
tem makes offenders savvy.  They quickly learn that programs
can be avoided without detection and this means that public
safety is not protected as offenders continue to drink and drive
with no substantial change in offending behavior.
A series of practical recommendations have been identified
by judges to improve the monitoring of repeat offenders.  Judges
agree that the flow of information to judges needs to be stream-
lined and centralized through probation and parole officers so
that monitoring by diverse agencies is synthesized and coordi-
nated, and opportunities to file “petitions to revoke” are not
overlooked.  Depending on the jurisdiction, various agencies
involved in the monitoring process (e.g., treatment providers)
may currently report directly and independently to the court,
compounding the paperwork problem.  Consequently, judges
may have to review several reports from various agencies about
one offender, complicating the monitoring process.  Judges
agree that forwarding this information to probation and sum-
marizing it in a single report would facilitate the monitoring
process.   Also, relatively small changes to the reporting process,
such as “flagging” reports of noncompliance, would enable
judges to quickly identify cases requiring attention and action.
Consistent and frequent contact with offenders and better
communication among the professionals involved (e.g., judges,
probation officers, and treatment providers) can significantly
improve its effectiveness.  Timely decision making and subse-
quent notification are essential to ensure that responsibilities
are fulfilled.  Judges acknowledge that this will require a con-
certed effort and immense cooperation from all agencies and
will be difficult to accomplish under current caseloads and
resource constraints.  However, the benefits that will accrue
make it an endeavor worth pursuing.
Judges also indicated strong support for the expansion of
problem-solving courts dealing with DWI issues.  Judges
acknowledge these specialized courts increase opportunities
for close supervision and offender accountability by streamlin-
ing the reporting process and centralizing the reporting effort
into a single management information system with frequent
progress reports to the judge.  Despite some concerns that have
been raised with regard to diverting resources from traditional
courts to support specialized caseloads, and the potential con-
flict with constitutional principles,6 there is strong belief in the
efficacy of these courts.7
2. Evidentiary Issues  
Judges expressed assorted concerns regarding the quality
and quantity of evidence that is gathered and presented in DWI
cases.  Previous reports clearly illustrate the complexity of this
multifaceted issue, particularly regarding the statutory require-
ments governing investigations and the subsequent collection
of evidence.8 Evidence that is not properly collected, docu-
mented, or presented in court significantly reduces the effec-
tiveness of DWI adjudication.
It is imperative that police officers adhere to proper proce-
dures and statutory requirements when evidence is collected
and documented.  Errors or omissions compromise the value of
the evidence and can effectively limit what judges may consider
at trial.  Unfortunately, due to the dynamic nature of the arrest
environment, a lack of training, and complicated statutory
requirements, errors are not uncommon in DWI arrests.  The
presentation of evidence is also critical and judges report that
inexperienced prosecutors may often overlook key evidence
because of their unfamiliarity with DWI prosecutions and
defense tactics.  As evidence of this, more than one-third of
judges believe that prosecutors do not have the same knowl-
edge and expertise about DWI and related evidentiary issues as
many defense attorneys, particularly those in private practice.  
Regardless of the expertise of attorneys and potential failings
at other phases of the system, judges must adhere to strict rules
of evidence and procedure when adjudicating these cases,
which limits their decision making to the consideration of spe-
cific facts.  Judges may be obliged to dismiss charges in cases
with evidentiary problems.  They estimated that, nationwide,
one in six repeat-offender cases is dismissed for these reasons.
Evidentiary problems may also result in judges accepting
“inequitable” plea agreements, excluding evidence or attribut-
ing it a lesser weight, or imposing a reduced sentence.  
Judges are also concerned about the ability of defendants to
refuse the evidentiary BAC test.  These refusals impede the col-
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lection of important evidence and can result in offenders avoid-
ing a conviction in many instances.  It has been established that
BAC evidence is frequently the most compelling evidence and
is often the only direct evidence of impairment.9 Without this
critical evidence, convictions are much more difficult to obtain
because much of the other evidence is subjective in nature and
open to opposing interpretations.  Some judges view refusal as
a direct violation of the implied consent laws and believe that
permitting defendants to refuse only serves to further encour-
age this behavior, which compromises the safety of the driving
public.
Judges have also expressed reservations about their ability to
evaluate important evidence and make informed rulings on evi-
dentiary motions.  Many admit that their knowledge of certain
scientific or technical evidence is limited.  Eighty-six percent
reported having insufficient knowledge about the science sur-
rounding blood partition ratios; 75% reported having insuffi-
cient knowledge about the process of retrograde extrapolation
of BACs; 65% reported having insufficient knowledge about
accident reconstruction techniques; 48% reported being insuf-
ficiently knowledgeable about the accuracy of different types of
BAC analysis; and 37% reported having inadequate knowledge
about horizontal gaze nystagmus testing.  Limited knowledge
of these issues makes it more difficult for judges to evaluate
adequately evidentiary motions filed by counsel or testimony
provided by expert witnesses in court.  However, even judges
who possess considerable knowledge of these scientific issues
and arguments are at a disadvantage if they rarely adjudicate
DWI cases because the use and interpretation of scientific evi-
dence is constantly evolving, which makes it difficult for them
to remain current on these issues.  
Furthermore, complex scientific arguments regarding the
interpretation of evidence are more likely to occur in DWI cases
involving serious bodily injury or death, making the conse-
quences of insufficient knowledge even more significant.  The
problem can be further exacerbated by the fact that, in some
states, lower court judges, particularly those presiding in
municipal courts, are not attorneys.  The lack of legal training
may impede the ability of these judges to interpret technical and
scientific evidence according to the applicable rules of evidence.
Judges proposed two key solutions to resolve the evidentiary
problems identified in the adjudication process. They consis-
tently endorsed more and continuing judicial education on
DWI evidentiary issues in light of its highly technical and con-
stantly evolving nature.  DWI cases are some of the most diffi-
cult to adjudicate.  Like homicides and sexual assaults, DWI
cases involve complex and technical evidentiary issues.
Although many specialized courses are available,10 caseloads
and resources often compro-
mise opportunities for judicial
participation.
A majority of judges rec-
ommend using legislation to
address the persistent prob-
lem of offenders refusing an
evidentiary breath test.  Such
legislation can ensure that
vital BAC evidence is more
consistently available.  More
than half of judges (55%) believe that criminalizing test refusal
will have considerable benefits.  Currently, only 11 states have
taken the step to either criminalize refusals or make it a sen-
tencing enhancement (Arkansas, California, Florida, Indiana,
Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode
Island, Vermont), but this alternative is becoming more popu-
lar.  Judges also recommend a variety of other legislative
options, including increasing penalties to remove the current
benefits of refusing (40%), admitting evidence of refusal in
court (33%), and permitting forced blood draws (27%) when
defendants refuse. 
These approaches have already demonstrated success in
some states.  For example, in California, where officers can pro-
ceed with forced blood draws and test refusal is a sentencing
enhancement, test refusal rates are less that 5%.  This is less
than the national refusal rate of 20%, and is substantially less
than some states where refusal rates exceed 50%.11
As another option, judges support the reduction of the strict
and burdensome statutory requirements for DWI investigations
and arrests to simplify procedures so that evidence is not weak-
ened or excluded due to technicalities.  Certain features of
problem-solving courts, such as highly experienced court offi-
cers, can also be valuable to address evidentiary issues since
these officers are in many instances better able to evaluate and
effectively adjudicate technical issues.12
3. Caseload
The “three-minute rule” is becoming more commonplace in
courtrooms across the country, with some judges reporting that
they process (through arraignments, pretrial hearings, and sen-
tencing) as many as 200 cases a day.  Three minutes is often all
the time a judge may have to review a case before accepting a
plea or imposing sentence.  Although there are no national sta-
tistics that accurately quantify the number of DWI cases
processed through the courts, it can be assumed that the large
majority of the 1.4 million DWI annual arrests13 end up in a
courtroom.  It is estimated that DWI cases comprise 10% of the
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criminal calendars of lower
courts.  In some states, per-
centages are as high as 40%.14
This provides some indication
of the volume of cases facing
judges each year.
Caseloads are impacted not
only by the total number of
DWI cases, but also by the
manner in which they are
processed, or the amount of
work involved.  For example,
some methods (e.g., plea agreements) are more expedient and
lead to resolution with minimal time and resources, whereas oth-
ers (e.g., jury trials) can remain on dockets for more than a year,
contributing to caseload volume and creating backlogs.  Cases
that go to trial demand considerable time and attention, thereby
reducing the judge’s time to hear and process other cases.  Over
a fourth of judges indicated that heavy caseloads detract from the
adjudication process by limiting the amount of time they have to
thoroughly review cases before ruling.  Despite judicial estimates
that only 16% of all DWI cases result in a trial, two-thirds of
judges reported that trial cases more often involve repeat offend-
ers who have learned that system-wide problems significantly
contribute to their chances for acquittal.
Insufficient time to review a case can result in inappropriate
outcomes because judges may lack opportunities to review
important evidence adequately and weigh it accordingly.  This
not only detracts from the deterrent effect of sanctioning but
can also allow repeat offenders to avoid identification.
Unfortunately, considerable pressure exists in most courtrooms
to keep the flow of cases moving in a timely manner, and judges
are often unable to review case files and records consistently to
identify those hard-core offender cases that should receive
greater attention.  Heavy caseloads also limit opportunities for
judicial education because judges are unable to get away from
their heavy dockets.  This in turn compounds existing eviden-
tiary problems by making it more difficult for judges to acquire
the technical expertise needed to adjudicate these cases.
Although 43% of judges agree that hiring more judges
would alleviate caseload issues, most understand that this is
unlikely to occur because of serious budgetary deficits.  As a
more realistic alternative, there is considerable support for the
enhanced use of problem-solving courts and specialized DWI
caseloads.  Judges and prosecutors with specialized expertise
facilitate more efficient and effective processing of cases and
improve outcomes, despite the fact that typically more time
may be spent with each offender.  Judges believe these courts
are better equipped to manage the volume of impaired driving
cases because professionals rapidly develop familiarity with
complex evidentiary issues, repeat offenders, and the use and
availability of various alternative sanctions.  In effect, these
professionals can manage cases more efficiently than multiple
judges sitting in traditional courts.
4. Motions and Continuances
Judges are accustomed to adjudicating a wide variety of
motions, which are frequently supported by memoranda and
other documents referencing relevant precedents.  Motions
have considerable implications for how a trial will proceed as
well as its outcome.  Not surprisingly, judges acknowledge that
these motions can often be used in a “frivolous” manner both
to complicate and to delay proceedings.  Moreover, they are fre-
quently used in cases involving repeat offenders or those
involving serious injury or death.
Although evidentiary motions contribute to the fundamen-
tal fairness of the trial process by both balancing and limiting
the evidence that may be considered, the overuse of motions
can create an abuse of process by burdening opposing counsel
with paperwork and placing considerable demands on a judge’s
time and court resources.  More than one-third (34%) of judges
in our survey reported that their ability to adhere to “case pro-
cessing” guidelines (typically ranging from three to six
months) is constrained by excessive motions.  Furthermore,
excessive motions increase processing delays that can ulti-
mately result in unwarranted dismissals and acquittals,
increased caseloads, and wasted resources.  For this reason, it
has been acknowledged that there is a need to restrict the
excessive use of motions and continuances.  
In response to this problem, some judges suggest strict
adherence to case-processing guidelines, which limits the
amount of time to resolve each case.  Many judges are becom-
ing proactive in this regard by making it clear to counsel that
limited time is permitted to hear motions.  They have also
placed clear limits on the granting of continuances.  Other
judges have been inspired to find more creative ways to limit
frivolous motions without assuming a “hard-line” approach.
For example, Judge James Dehn of the 10th Judicial District of
Minnesota has pioneered a program that requires the defendant
to participate in pretrial home alcohol testing in lieu of maxi-
mum bail.  Failure to test or a positive test results in the imme-
diate arrest of the defendant.  This program has proven to be an
effective pretrial tool to decrease delays resulting from frivolous
motions and continuances because many defendants do not
stay sober while their case is pending.  Independent research
conducted by the Minnesota House of Representatives Research
Department concluded that multiple benefits are associated
with this program.15
5. Failure to Appear
Failing to appear for arraignment, trial, or sentencing is not
uncommon for offenders seeking to avoid prosecution, convic-
tion, or sanctioning.  The prevalence of this behavior, which
ranges from 10% to 30%, is often linked to the presence of sur-
rounding borders with other states or counties.  Nominal
penalties and the difficulties associated with apprehending
offenders once they have left the immediate jurisdiction
encourage this behavior.  Judges report that a lack of reciproc-
ity exists among some neighboring jurisdictions and that war-
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rants from other jurisdictions may be routinely ignored.  Many
district attorneys are also loath to initiate extradition proceed-
ings for misdemeanor defendants because of competing priori-
ties and fiscal restraints.  Consequently, offenders are rarely
returned to court and sanctioned for either the original DWI
charge or the subsequent charge of failure to appear.  
A majority of judges agree that failing to appear is more
common among hard-core repeat offenders, who go to consid-
erable lengths to avoid conviction.  Savvy offenders know that
police are unable to locate defendants quickly and that war-
rants are routinely purged from record systems in many states,
allowing offenders to avoid prosecution and conviction.  In
addition, permanent records are rarely kept of an offender’s fail-
ure to appear; therefore,  there is no record of his or her
propensity to fail to appear, leaving subsequent judges with no
knowledge of this behavior.
More than one-third of judges (40%) strongly endorse mak-
ing bond a condition of the arrest warrant issued for failure to
appear.  However, if constitutional considerations preclude the
advance imposition of bond, at a minimum, instructions not to
release the offender on recognizance should be clearly stated on
the warrant to inform the arraigning judge of the offender’s
propensity for this behavior.  One-quarter of judges recom-
mend custody for offenders who have a predisposition for this
behavior to ensure their appearance at trial.  However, this is
not always practicable in light of overcrowding issues that exist
in many jurisdictions.16 Yet efforts should be made to ensure
custody, considering current rates of recidivism among this
population. 
6. Records  
Current and accurate information is critical to judicial deci-
sion making.  Judges rely on records in almost every stage of
adjudication.  Poor records impede the effectiveness of critical
decisions at the pretrial, trial, and sentencing stages because
judges often rely exclusively on the information contained in
important records.  The omission of prior convictions or sen-
tences imposed in relation to specific charges makes it difficult
for judges to determine the fairness of plea agreements.
Knowledge of prior convictions is imperative to determine eli-
gibility for diversion programs or whether elevated penalties
are appropriate. Presentence reports often contain the most
comprehensive information and assist the judge in identifying
an appropriate sentence.  However, these reports are not con-
sistently available in many jurisdictions because of a lack of
probation services.  
Records—including driving and criminal history records,
alcohol evaluations, and presentence reports—are maintained
by different agencies, for different time periods.  It has also
been widely recognized that records, particularly criminal his-
tory and driver abstracts, vary in terms of the accuracy of infor-
mation they contain.  Inefficient access to relevant information
further impedes decision making and the effective adjudication
of these offenses.
Limited information may also
result in offenders avoiding
identification as a repeat
offender, allowing them to avoid
harsher sanctions typically
imposed for repeat offenses.
According to judges, repeat
offenders with prior convictions
in a different jurisdiction will
typically plead guilty to new
charges immediately in an
attempt to resolve a case before
their repeat offender status is discovered.
Currently, almost half of judges (44%) rely upon the
National Driver Register (NDR) as an effective tool for identi-
fying prior convictions.  The information contained in this
database is derived from reports forwarded from the licensing
agencies of every state.  However, the ability of state reposito-
ries to maintain accurate records is largely dependent on their
ability to collect and enter pertinent information from multi-
ple agencies (e.g., police, courts) in real time.  In some juris-
dictions, it may take more than six months for arrests and
convictions to be recorded.  In other jurisdictions, convic-
tions may be omitted entirely.  Although the NDR database
expedites the record-searching process, judges support the
continued effort to improve the timeliness and quality of its
information.
Judges also agree that state licensing agencies should pro-
duce standardized driver abstracts that are similar in content
and structure to facilitate their review and admission in court
proceedings.  More than a third of the judges surveyed agreed
that standardized driver abstracts are the best method to
improve the utility of driving records and the sanctioning of
hard-core drinking drivers.
7. Sentencing Disparity  
Uniformity in sentencing is quite difficult to achieve despite
the best efforts of the judiciary, particularly when an enormous
number of judges are involved in the adjudication of these
cases.  Disparity frequently occurs because offenders possess
diverse individual characteristics and judges are required to
consider a wide range of aggravating and mitigating factors,
including the seriousness of the offense, any injuries or fatali-
ties, prior convictions, probation recommendations, alcohol
evaluations, treatment history, social stability, and family
issues.17
Even after accounting for these factors, however, real dis-
parities still exist. Judges are often limited in what sanctions
they can impose because of fiscal constraints.  Indeed, more
than 65% of judges reported that these concerns impact sen-
tencing decisions.  Furthermore, judges vary in their confi-
dence with available sanctions, personal experience, the avail-
Summer 2003 - Court Review 13
16. For a report on jail overcrowding see Mark A. Cunniff, Jail
Crowding: Understanding Jail Population Dynamics, Nat’l Inst. of
Corr., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (2002), available at
http://nicic.org/pubs/2002/017209.pdf.  
17. Don  M. Gottfredson, Effects of Judges’ Sentencing Decisions, Nat’l
Inst. of Justice (1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdf-
files1/nij/178889.pdf.  
Savvy 
offenders know
that police are
unable to locate
defendants
quickly and that
warrants are 
routinely
purged . . . .
14 Court Review - Summer 2003
ability of sanctioning options,
and the resources required to
support sanction alternatives. 
Regardless of the reason it
occurs, disparity in sentencing
can result in inappropriate sanc-
tions and reduce the likelihood
of behavior change—i.e., offend-
ers will be more likely to recidi-
vate.  More importantly, disparity
often leads to “judge-shopping,”
where offenders seek to have
their case adjudicated by a judge who is perceived to be more
lenient.  Defendants familiar with the system quickly learn
what “standard” penalties individual judges impose in DWI
cases and will attempt to mitigate their punishment to the
extent possible.  Nearly half (46%) of judges report that judge-
shopping occurs occasionally or often. 
To reduce sentencing disparity, judges need a greater famil-
iarity with the “what works” literature that evaluates the effec-
tiveness of various sanctioning methods.  Improved access to
this scientific literature will enable judges to develop a more
uniform body of knowledge to draw upon when making sen-
tencing decisions.  A majority of judges (80%) agree that brief
summaries containing scientific evaluations of the effectiveness
of various sanctions would be advantageous in making effective
sentencing decisions.  This uniformity of knowledge could also
lead to reductions in disparity and lower recidivism rates.
Many judges (74%) agree that the development and imple-
mentation of tiered penalties in states where they do not cur-
rently exist could reduce disparity.  Tiered penalties specify a
reasonable range of penalties that may be ordered, while still
accommodating discretionary decision making based on indi-
vidual circumstances.  With a tiered system, judges will also be
able to impose more appropriate penalties for repeat offenders
than are currently possible in some states.
8. Mandatory Minimum Sentences
Mandatory minimum sentences stipulate the nature and level
of sanctions that are to be imposed for certain offenses.
Although the intention of these sentences was to bring consis-
tency and uniformity to sentencing, judges believe that, in some
instances, minimums may have had the opposite effect.  There
is some evidence that minimums detract from the effectiveness
of sentencing when mandated sanctions are either inappropriate
or inapplicable.  For example, it is not unusual for some repeat
offenders to be excluded from minimums because of certain
policies and requirements.  Moreover, loopholes in penalty leg-
islation make them confusing to apply and judges must often
resort to subjective interpretations to determine their applica-
tion.  Also, regardless of the decision made by the sentencing
judge, there may be limited resources to carry out the sentence. 
The composition and structure of mandatory minimum sen-
tences can compromise their effectiveness in a variety of ways.
The most notable example involves mandatory incarceration
for brief periods.  Unfortunately, many jurisdictions suffer from
jail overcrowding so many offenders are never required to serve
their sentences.  This is just one example of the many
“unfunded mandates” that judges cannot enforce.  Ignition
interlocks are often mandatory for repeat offenses but there
may be no service provider available to install this device, mak-
ing compliance impossible.  Many jurisdictions report long
waiting times for admission to treatment programs, and those
offenders with a history of violence (due to alcohol or drugs)
are often ineligible.  Driving suspensions or revocations can
also be circumvented in jurisdictions where “hardship” licenses
are available or the lack of alternative means of transportation
make noncompliance inevitable. 
The legislation mandating these minimums may also be suf-
ficiently vague to result in the inconsistent interpretation of
legislative requirements, meaning that minimums may not be
uniformly applied.  One judge succinctly described the prob-
lem, stating, “I have no problem with mandatory minimums,
but I have a hard time figuring out when they apply.”18
Unfortunately, the provisions contained in mandatory mini-
mum sentences are often not reflective of the current state of
knowledge regarding sanction effectiveness, and do not accom-
modate jurisdictional considerations, the policies of respective
sanctioning programs, or budgetary constraints.  Perhaps of
greatest concern is that a lack of resources leads to the incon-
sistent use of minimums and erodes the certainty of appropri-
ate punishment.  This reduces the likelihood that sanctions will
produce the desired behavior change or deter recidivism.  It
also undermines public confidence in the system.
Judges recommend the review and enhancement of manda-
tory minimums to include more alternative and creative sen-
tencing options.  A more progressive attitude toward sanction-
ing has evolved among the judiciary and existing research sub-
stantiates the belief that incarceration is not as effective as pre-
viously believed.19 Programs including greater supervision for
persistent offenders and access to meaningful treatment are rec-
ommended by judges as well as other innovative programs that
demonstrate significant reductions in recidivism.  
Judges also recommend a legislative review to update and
clarify existing legislation in order to promote and encourage
greater consistency in the use of mandated sanctions.  The
vague language currently used in many statutes is of particular
concern because it requires judges to rely on subjective and
conflicting interpretations.  Any new legislation or language
revisions should be sufficiently precise to close loopholes and
prevent the circumvention of penalties.  Perhaps most impor-
tant is the recommendation that appropriate resources be allo-
cated to ensure that programs and facilities will be able to
accommodate sentenced offenders.  Mandated sanctions are
meaningless if there are no facilities or service providers to
deliver programs.
18. Survey Responses from Judges Attending the Minnesota Annual
Judges Conference, Bloomington Marriot, Bloomington,
Minnesota (Dec. 9, 1999).
19. NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND
PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENT IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING
SYSTEM (1990).
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the information needed to redress existing flaws in the form of
practical and cost-effective recommendations.  Criminal justice
agencies and associations need to take action to ensure that
these recommendations are carried forwarded and imple-
mented in a meaningful fashion.  Only then will we see the type
of reductions in alcohol-related fatalities that occurred in the
1980s.  
On a positive note, many agencies and associations are now
modifying existing training programs, developing new curric-
ula, and reexamining current policies and practices to identify
ways they can collaborate to close loopholes and improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of the system.  A key ingredient in
achieving this goal is the development of cooperative initiatives
to improve communication and share information.  Key stake-
holders from government, criminal justice, and highway safety
arenas are encouraged to become involved in the process of
reviewing current practices at a state level and determining
where problems exist and what improvements can be made.     
Increasing efforts to raise awareness and promote educa-
tional initiatives should be a primary concern.  The success of
these efforts can be enhanced through greater communication
and information-sharing among stakeholders.  Most impor-
tantly, all of the agencies that have a vested interest in achiev-
ing reductions should participate in the review process to
ensure that outcomes will produce results in the form of reduc-
tions in alcohol-related fatalities.
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9. Juries
A final issue of concern to judges involves the availability of
jury trials in DWI cases.  Judges report that repeat offenders are
more likely to elect a jury trial, particularly in cases involving
serious injury or death, because of the potential for extended
incarceration.  Aside from delaying a case several months (due
to the time it takes to reach trial on the jury docket and impanel
suitable jurors), offenders making this election also benefit
from lower conviction rates insofar as DWI jury trials result in
fewer convictions than jury trials involving other criminal
cases—60% and 75%, respectively.  
A primary concern with jury elections is that jurors are often
unable to evaluate critical and scientific evidence based on legal
rules and are more likely to reach inappropriate verdicts.  It is
the experience of many judges that juries tend to make
assumptions about the evidence that are incorrect.  Oftentimes,
the prosecution has no recourse to correct these errors.  Also,
despite the dramatic change in social attitudes toward impaired
driving that has been achieved in the past two decades, offend-
ers occasionally benefit from the sympathetic mind-set of
jurors. 
Permitting offenders to elect jury trials, particularly for mis-
demeanor offenses, impedes the effectiveness of the justice sys-
tem.  Not only do jury elections permit offenders to avoid sanc-
tioning, but the lack of consequences does little to deter
impaired driving or change problem behavior.  These trials also
tend to exacerbate caseloads and waste scarce court resources.
As a solution to this problem, a majority of judges (75%)
agree that evidence of test refusal should be admissible at trial
in an effort to balance current inequities in the process.  A lim-
ited number of judges (only 25%) believe that jurors should be
made aware of prior convictions as well.  The inclusion of this
critical evidence would permit juries a more accurate depiction
of important facts and circumstances with which to weigh evi-
dence, and likely result in the rendering of more appropriate
verdicts.  Finally, it has been suggested that jury trials be elim-
inated as an option for lesser or misdemeanor offenses in order
to streamline processing and reduce caseloads.
SUMMARY 
Our series of reports clearly demonstrates how the unprece-
dented growth in DWI legislation in the past two decades has
resulted in a complex and cumbersome system.  At each phase,
criminal justice professionals operate amidst a myriad of com-
peting priorities and conflicting interests.  Police officers strive
to establish probable cause, whereas prosecutors must prove
their cases beyond a reasonable doubt.  Judges can only admit
evidence that meets rigorous standards and must become
experts in a wide variety of scientific areas.  Despite these prob-
lems, the system does work, with an average of 1.4 million
offenders being arrested annually.  Much needed legislation has
been drafted, implemented, and is already in place in a major-
ity of states.  Now, politicians should turn their attention to
ensuring that important policies and programs achieve their
intent and make the system work more efficiently and effec-
tively.  If we are to change problem behavior and protect pub-
lic safety, we must ensure that guilty offenders are appre-
hended, prosecuted, convicted, sanctioned, and monitored.  
Dedicated professionals across the country have provided
without the benefit of Miranda, in the emergency room of a
hospital prior to and during his treatment for two gunshot
wounds, which left him paralyzed and blind.  The Fifth
Amendment, made applicable to states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, requires that “no person . . . shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”  The court
concluded that there was no Fifth Amendment violation
because there was no “criminal case” to trigger the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee against self-incrimination.  Thomas
writes that a “criminal case . . . requires the initiation of legal
proceedings;” the Fifth Amendment protection is a “trial right.”
The Court, however, remands the case to determine whether or
not petitioner has unsuccessfully stated a claim for violation of
his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights.  
FIFTH AMENDMENT: INVOLUNTARY DRUG
ADMINISTRATION TO CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
In Sell v. United States,4 a 6-3 Court, in an opinion written by
Justice Breyer, held that the involuntary administration of drugs
to an individual accused of a crime to make him competent to
stand trial does not violate that individual’s Fifth Amendment
“liberty” rights provided that it is necessary to achieve impor-
tant governmental trial-related interests.  The Court looked to
two prior cases to reach this conclusion, Washington v. Harper,5
and Riggins v. Nevada.6 In Harper, the Court held that “the Due
Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate who
has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his
will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the
treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.”  While the Court
recognized “that an individual has a ‘significant’ constitutionally
protected ‘liberty interest’ in ‘avoiding the unwanted adminis-
tration of antipsychotic drugs,’” the Court determined that the
state’s interest was “legitimate” and “important” allowing such
treatment when the inmate poses a threat to himself or others.
In Riggins, the Court “repeated that an individual has a consti-
tutionally protected liberty ‘interest in avoiding involuntary
administration of antipsychotic drugs’—an interest that only an
‘essential’ or ‘overriding’ state interest might overcome.”  It also
“suggested that, in principle, forced medication in order to ren-
der a defendant competent to stand trial for murder was consti-
tutionally permissible.”  
In criminal cases, this term of the United States SupremeCourt had several important decisions, but no landmarkcases.  The Court continued to favor law enforcement.  One
significant development was the substantial impact of section
2254(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act is
having in closing the door of federal courts to state prisoners
petitioning for the writ of habeas corpus.  Here are several of
the important criminal decisions decided this term.1
FOURTH AMENDMENT: ILLEGAL DETENTION AND
COERCED CONFESSIONS
The Court, per curiam, in Kaupp v. Texas,2 determined that a
suspect’s “detention” in the middle of the night by a cohort of
police officers without an arrest warrant or any probable cause
is sufficiently similar to an arrest to warrant suppression of his
confession under the Fourth Amendment.  The suspect was
awoken in the middle of the night by police officers, taken from
bed to the scene of the crime, and then taken to the sheriff’s
headquarters.  There, he was given his Miranda warnings and
questioned.  He eventually confessed to participating in the
crime. The detectives acted on a “pocket warrant;” they did not
seek a conventional arrest warrant because they did not believe
that they had sufficient evidence for probable cause.  The con-
fession was allowed into evidence at trial and the petitioner was
convicted.  Reversing and remanding the decision, the court
stated, “Although certain seizures may be justified on some-
thing less than probable cause, . . . [the Court has] never ‘sus-
tained against Fourth Amendment challenge the involuntary
removal of a suspect from his home to a police station and his
detention there for investigative purposes . . . absent probable
cause or judicial authorization.”  
FIFTH AMENDMENT: POLICE INTERROGATION
Justice Thomas announced the judgment of the Court in
Chavez v. Martinez.3 Here, the court found that the petitioner
failed to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983
for violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrim-
ination when he was coercively interrogated, but was never
prosecuted for a crime, let alone compelled to be a witness
against himself in a criminal case.  Petitioner was shot during
an altercation with two police officers and was questioned,
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The Court surmised that these two cases “indicate that the
Constitution permits the Government to involuntarily adminis-
ter antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing seri-
ous criminal charges in order to render that defendant compe-
tent to stand trial, but only if the treatment is medically appro-
priate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may
undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of less
intrusive alternative, is significantly necessary to further impor-
tant governmental trial-related interests.”  The Court enumer-
ated a four-part test.  First, there must be an “important gov-
ernmental interest” at stake.  Second, “the court must conclude
that involuntary medication will significantly further those
concomitant state interests,” i.e., “administration of the drugs is
substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand
trial.”  Third, “the court must conclude that involuntary med-
ication is necessary to further those interests,” that “alternative,
less intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially
the same results.”  And last, “the court must conclude that
administration of the drugs is medically appropriate, i.e., in the
patient’s best medical interest in light of his medical condition.”
FIFTH AMENDMENT: DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT PROCEEDINGS
Addressing the issue of double jeopardy, the Court, in
Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania,7 held double jeopardy was not a bar
when a defendant is sentenced to death at retrial after having
been sentenced to life at the initial trial pursuant to a state law
that mandates a life sentence when a jury is deadlocked on the
issue of sentencing.  In this case, after the guilt phase of the
trial, a trial for the penalty phase was held.  The jury could not
reach a decision and defendant moved under Pennsylvania law
that the jury be discharged and that the court enter a sentence
of life imprisonment.  The judge entered the required life sen-
tence.  Defendant then appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior
Court, which concluded that the trial judge had incorrectly
instructed the jury on several offenses, including the first-
degree murder charge.  The Superior Court reversed and
remanded the case.  On remand, Pennsylvania filed a notice of
intent to seek the death penalty.  In addition to the aggravating
circumstance alleged at the first sentencing, the notice also
alleged another aggravating circumstance—his newly acquired
felony record from his various guilty pleas at the first trial.
Defendant moved to prevent the state from seeking the death
penalty and was denied. The Superior Court and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the denial.  At the sec-
ond trial, defendant was convicted and sentenced to death.
In a 5-4 decision, delivered by Justice Scalia, the Court held
that there was no double jeopardy bar to Pennsylvania’s seek-
ing the death penalty on retrial.  Under the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment “no person shall . . . be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”
Along with reliance on other cases, the Court cited to Stroud v.
United States,8 where it recognized, as here, “[When a] defen-
dant is convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprison-
7. 123 S. Ct. 732 (2003).
8. 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
9. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
10. 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003).
11. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
12. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
ment, but appeals the con-
viction and succeeds in hav-
ing it set aside . . . jeopardy
has not terminated, so the
life sentence imposed in
connection with the initial
conviction raises no double
jeopardy bar to a death sen-
tence on retrial.”  The Court
rejected defendant’s con-
tention that due to the
unique treatment afforded
capital-sentencing proceed-
ings under Bullington v.
Missouri,9 double-jeopardy
protections were raised
when the jury deadlocked at
his first sentencing proceedings and the court prescribed a sen-
tence of life imprisonment pursuant to Pennsylvania law.  The
Court maintained that the automatic life sentence pursuant to
Pennsylvania law is not an acquittal, and the Court noted that
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found no statutory intent to
the contrary.  Finally, the Court also rejected defendant’s claim
Fourteenth Amendment due process violation, finding nothing
indicated that any “life” or “liberty” interest that Pennsylvania
law gave defendant after the first trial was “somehow
immutable.”  
SIXTH AMENDMENT: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL
In Wiggins v. Smith,10 Justice O’Connor wrote the opinion
for the 7-2 Court.  In this case, the Court determined that the
test for ineffective assistance of counsel, under Strickland v.
Washington,11 requires trial counsel to fully investigate a
defendant’s life history when trial counsel has reason to believe
those facts might lead to mitigation in a death penalty action.
During the sentencing phase of a trial, petitioner’s trial counsel
indicated to the jury that they would hear evidence in mitiga-
tion that petitioner “has had a difficult life.”  However, no evi-
dence was presented during the proceedings.  Trial counsel
had some knowledge of petitioner’s background, but not the
full picture.  Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, challeng-
ing “the adequacy of his representation at sentencing, arguing
that his attorneys had rendered constitutionally defective assis-
tance by failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence
of his dysfunctional background.”  
The Court first recognized that its consideration of
Wiggins’s claim was controlled by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, which limits
their analysis “to the law as it was ‘clearly established’ by our
precedents at the time of the state court’s decisions.”  In
Strickland v. Washington,12 the Court established the legal rules
governing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  The peti-
tioner must show: (1) “counsel’s performance was deficient;”
“[T]he Constitution
permits the
Government to
involuntarily 
administer
antipsychotic drugs
to a mentally ill
defendant . . . 
in order to render
that defendant 
competent to
stand trial . . . .”
18 Court Review - Summer 2003
and (2) “the deficiency prej-
udiced the defense.”
Although the Court has not
specified guidelines for
deficient performance, it
has stated that to show defi-
cient performance “a peti-
tioner must demonstrate
that counsel’s representa-
tion ‘fell below an objective
standard of reasonable-
ness.’”  In this case, trial
counsel “attempt to justify
their limited investigation
as reflecting a tactical judg-
ment not to present mitigat-
ing evidence at sentencing and to pursue an alternate strategy
instead.”  The Court concluded, however, that the trial coun-
sel’s failure to investigate more fully into petitioner’s back-
ground “fell short of the professional standards that prevailed
in Maryland in 1989.”  
EIGHTH AMENDMENT: SENTENCING AND THREE-
STRIKES LEGISLATION
In Ewing v. California,13 a 5-4 decision, the Court deter-
mined that a prison sentence of 25 years to life, imposed for
the offense of felony grand theft under the three-strikes law,
was not grossly disproportionate and in violation of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.
Under California law, grand theft is considered a “wobbler,”
meaning it is presumptively a felony, but at the discretion of
the trial court, may be reduced to a misdemeanor.  In this case,
although the defendant asked the court to reduce the convic-
tion for grand theft to a misdemeanor so as to avoid a three-
strikes sentence, or alternatively to exercise its discretion to
dismiss the allegations of some or all of his prior serious or vio-
lent felony convictions, the trial court refused and defendant
was sentenced to 25 years to life under California’s three-
strikes legislation.  
The Court, in upholding the sentence, first considered the
reasoning in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Harmelin
v. Michigan:14 “The Eighth Amendment, which forbids cruel
and unusual punishments, contains a ‘narrow proportionality
principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’”  The Court
also looked to Rummel v. Estelle,15 where it “held that it did not
violate the Eighth Amendment for a State to sentence a three-
time offender to life in prison with the possibility of parole.”
The Court cited Rummel for the proposition that “‘federal courts
should be reluctant to review legislatively mandated terms of
imprisonment, and that successful challenges to the propor-
tionality of particular sentences should be exceedingly rare.’” 
Turning to its seemingly contrary decision in Solem v.
Helm,16 in which the Court held unconstitutional the sentence
of life without the possibility of parole for the seventh in a
string of nonviolent offenses, the Court noted that in applying
the three factors relevant to the determination of whether a
sentence is so disproportionate that it violates the Eighth
Amendment, the Solem Court struck down the sentence, but
specifically noted the contrast between that sentence and the
sentence in Rummel, where the defendant was eligible for
parole.  Furthermore, the Solem Court specifically declined to
overrule Rummel.  Considering three-strikes legislation on a
more general note, the Court concluded, “We do not sit as a
‘superlegislature’ to second-guess these policy choices.  It is
enough that the State of California has a reasonable basis for
believing that dramatically enhanced sentences for habitual
felons ‘advances the goals of [its] criminal justice system in
any substantial way.’”
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: ANTITERRORISM AND
EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT
In Lockyer v. Andrade,17 a 5-4 Court in an opinion written by
Justice O’Connor, held that the Ninth Circuit erred in ruling
that the lower court’s affirmation of respondent’s sentence for
two consecutive terms of 25 years to life for two counts of theft
totaling less than $200 in videotapes was contrary to, or an
unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent under
section 2254(d)(1) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996.  California’s three-strikes law mandates
that any felony can constitute the third strike and can subject a
defendant to a term of 25 years to life in prison.  Respondent
received such a sentence.  Reviewing respondent’s habeas cor-
pus petition, the Ninth Circuit, looking to Rummel v. Estelle,18
Solem v. Helm,19 and Harmelin v. Michigan,20 concluded that
both Rummel and Solem remained “good law” and were
“instructive in Harmelin’s application.”  It stated that because
the California Court of Appeals compared the facts of Andrade’s
case to the facts of Rummel, but not Solem, the state court unrea-
sonably applied clearly established Supreme Court law.  In
addressing the threshold matter of what constitutes clearly
established federal law, the Court noted that, according to
Williams v. Taylor,21 it can only be the holdings and not the dicta
of Supreme Court decisions at the time of a state court’s ruling.
The Court conceded that this case was difficult because
Supreme Court holdings on this issue had not been “a model of
clarity.”  The Court stated, “Through this thicket of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, one governing legal principle
emerges as ‘clearly’ established under § 2254(d)(1):  A gross
disproportionality principle is applicable to sentences for terms
of years.”  However, the Court concluded, “The only relevant
clearly established law amenable to the ‘contrary to’ or ‘unrea-
sonable application of’ framework is the gross disproportional-
ity principle, the precise contours of which are unclear, applic-
able only in the ‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’ case.”
13. 123 S. Ct. 1179 (2003).
14. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
15. 445 U.S. 263 (1983).
16. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
17. 123 S. Ct. 1166 (2003).
18. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
19. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
20. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
21. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
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The final question for the Court was whether the California
Court of Appeals decision affirming Andrade’s sentence was
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,” this
disproportionality principle.  Here, the Court made two points.
First, the Court concluded that because Harmelin and Solem
specifically stated that they did not overrule Rummel, it was not
contrary to the Court’s clearly established law for the
California Court of Appeals to turn to Rummel in deciding
whether a sentence was grossly disproportionate.  Further,
Harmelin allows a state court to reasonably rely on Rummel in
determining whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate.
Therefore, the Court concluded, the California Court of
Appeals decision was not “contrary to” the governing legal
principles set forth in these cases.  
EX POST FACTO CLAUSE: STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the 5-4 Court in
Stogner v. California.22 Here, the Court held that the California
statute resurrecting an otherwise time-barred criminal prose-
cution, which was enacted after the pre-existing statute of lim-
itation had run, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United
States Constitution.  The California statute at issue permits
“prosecution for those crimes where ‘the limitations period
specified in [prior statutes of limitations] has expired’ – pro-
vided that (1) a victim has reported an allegation of abuse to
the police, (2) ‘there is independent evidence that clearly and
convincingly corroborates the victim’s allegation,’ and (3) the
prosecution is begun within one year of the victim’s report.”  A
related provision provides “that a prosecution satisfying these
three conditions ‘shall revive any cause of action barred by
[prior statute of limitations].’” 
The Constitution has two Ex Post Facto Clauses, Article I,
section 9, clause 3, which applies to the federal government,
and Article I, section 10, clause 1, which applies to states.  Both
prohibit the governments from “enacting laws with certain
retroactive effects.”  The Court recognized three effects of the
California statute: (1) it creates a “new criminal limitations
period that extends the time in which prosecution is allowed;”
(2) it authorizes “criminal prosecutions that the passage of
time had previously barred;” and (3) it was enacted after the
statute of limitations had run for the crime for which peti-
tioner was prosecuted.  The Court concluded that these three
effects rendered the statute invalid under the Ex Post Facto
Clause.  First, the Court concluded that the statute “threatens
the kind of harm that . . . the Ex Post Facto Clause seeks to
avoid:” “the Clause protects liberty by preventing governments
from enacting statutes with ‘manifestly unjust and oppressive’
retroactive effects.”  Second, the Court determined that “the
kind of statute at issue falls literally within the categorical
description of ex post facto laws set forth by Justice Chase more
than 200 years before in Calder v. Bul.23 The Court stated: “[A]
statute of limitations reflects a legislative judgment that, after
a certain time, no quantum of evidence is sufficient to convict
. . . . Consequently, to resurrect a prosecution after the relevant
statute of limitations has expired is to eliminate a currently
existing conclusive presumption
forbidding prosecution, and
thereby to permit prosecution
on a quantum of evidence where
that quantum, at the time the
new law is enacted, would have
been legally insufficient.”
EX POST FACTO CLAUSE: ALASKA SEX OFFENDER
REGISTRATION ACT
In Smith v. Doe,24 a 6-3 Court held that the Alaska Sex
Offender Registration Act of 1994 is nonpunitive and its
retroactive application does not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause.  On May 12, 1994, Alaska enacted the Alaska Sex
Offender Registration Act.  This law contains two components,
which are both retroactive.  The Act requires any “sex offender
or child kidnapper who is physically present in the state” to
register, either with the Department of Corrections, if the indi-
vidual is incarcerated, or with the local law enforcement
authorities if the individual is at liberty.  He must provide
name, aliases, identifying features, address, place of employ-
ment, date of birth, conviction information, information about
personal transportation, post-conviction treatment history, and
other such information.  The second component is the public
release of this information.  Respondents brought actions
under Rev. Stat. section 1979, 42 U.S.C. section 1983, seeking
to declare the Act void under the Ex Post Facto Clause of
Article I, section 10, clause 1, of the Constitution and the Due
Process Clause of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court began its analysis by noting that this was the first
time that it has considered a sex offender registration law
against Ex Post Facto Clause protection, but that the frame-
work for the Court’s inquiry is well established: first, the Court
must determine “whether the legislature meant the statute to
establish ‘civil’ proceedings;’” second, “if the intention of the
legislature was to impose punishment, that ends the inquiry.
. . . However, [if] the intention was to enact a regulatory
scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must further examine
whether the statutory scheme is ‘so punitive either in purpose
or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention’ to deem it ‘civil.’
. . .”  Furthermore, because the Court ordinarily defers to the
legislature’s stated intent, “‘only the clearest proof’ will suffice
to override legislative intent and transform what has been
denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.’”
Reviewing legislative history, the Court concluded that
“nothing on the face of the statute suggests that the legislature
sought to create anything other than a civil . . . scheme
designed to protect the public from harm.”  Next, the Court
considered whether the Act imposes an “affirmative disability
or restraint” and concluded that it did not.  The Court rea-
soned that the Act imposes no physical restraint, which is the
affirmative example.  Further, “[t]he Act’s obligations are less
harsh than the sanctions of occupational debarment, which we
have held to be nonpunitive.”  In rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s
contention that the updating of the sex offender’s information
22. 123 S. Ct. 2446 (2003).
23. 3 U.S. 386 (1798).  
24. 123 S. Ct. 1140 (2003).
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poses a restriction and that
the Act resembles a proba-
tion scheme, the Court rea-
soned that the sex offender
does not have to update in
person, and that “offenders
subject to the Alaska
statute are free to move
where they wish and to live
and work as other citizens,
with no supervision.” The
Court also rejected Doe’s assertion that the length of the
reporting time was not proportional to the severity of the
offense and is retributive.  
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS: SEX
OFFENDER REGISTRY
In Connecticut Department of Public Safety, et al.  v. John Doe,25
a unanimous Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, held that Connecticut’s sex offender registry pro-
gram was not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause.  The Connecticut law requires all persons con-
victed of (a) a criminal offense against a minor, (b) violent or
nonviolent sexual offenses, or (c) felonies committed for a sex-
ual purpose, to register with the Connecticut Department of
Public Safety upon their release.  The registry requires names,
addresses, photographs, and DNA samples, as well as updated
photographs and notification of changes in address.  All registry
postings must include a warning that those who use the registry
improperly (as in to harass) will be subject to prosecution.
Reversing the lower courts, the Court determined that there
was no due process violation because the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require an opportunity to prove a fact not
material to the statutory scheme, i.e., a hearing first to deter-
mine whether or not the class members are “particularly likely
to be currently dangerous before being labeled as such by their
inclusion in a publicly disseminated registry.”  Citing to Paul v.
Davis,26 the Court stated “that mere injury to reputation, even
if defamatory, does not constitute the deprivation of a liberty
interest.”    Furthermore, the Court distinguished both
Wisconsin v. Constantineau,27 and Goss v. Lopez,28 which cumu-
latively require the Government to provide hearings to prove or
disprove certain facts, stating, “[h]ere, however, the fact that
respondent seeks to prove—he is not currently dangerous—is
of no consequence. . . . [a]s the DPS Website explains, the law’s
requirements turn on an offender’s conviction alone—a fact
that a convicted offender has already had a procedurally safe-
guarded opportunity to contest.”
CRIMINAL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT—RICO
In Pacificare Health Care Systems, Inc. v. Book,29 Justice
Scalia wrote the opinion, and all other justices joined, except
for Justice Thomas, who took no part in the decision. Here, the
Court held that it would be premature for the it to address the
issue of  whether an arbitration agreement that contains a
punitive damages restriction is unenforceable with regards to a
parties’ claim for treble damages under RICO because it was
unclear whether the provision did and would actually be
applied to the RICO claims by the arbitrator. The arbitration
agreements in this action contained clauses limiting the award
of punitive damages.  Respondent opposed arbitration because
“the arbitration provisions prohibit an award of punitive dam-
ages,” and “respondents could not obtain ‘meaningful relief’ in
arbitration for their claims under the RICO statute, which
authorizes treble damages.”  The Court wrote that neither
“precedents” nor “the ambiguous terms of the contracts”
necessitate that these “provisions preclude an arbitrator from
awarding treble-damages under RICO.” The Court noted that
its prior cases “have placed different statutory treble-damages
provisions on different points along the spectrum between
purely compensatory and strictly punitive awards.”  The Court
stated that if the contractual ambiguity, itself, were a “gateway”
question, then there would be no question about its ability to
decide the issue.  However, the ambiguity as to the language
and how the arbitrator will construe the remedial provisions,
and whether this will render the “agreements unenforceable,”
is “unusually abstract.”  Therefore, “the proper course is to
compel arbitration.”   
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: HOBBS ACT AND THE
RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT
ORGANIZATIONS ACT (RICO)
In Scheidler v. National Organization for Women,30 petitioners
presented an argument alleging that respondents “were mem-
bers of a nationwide conspiracy to ‘shut down’ abortion clinics
through a pattern of racketeering activity that included actions
of extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act.”  Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, held the Hobbs Act and RICO
may not be applied to anti-abortion activist organizations or
individuals because such groups or individuals do not “obtain”
property in a manner necessary for a predicate act of extortion.
The Court began its analysis with the assertion that it “need not
now trace what are the outer boundaries of extortion liability
under the Hobbs Act, so that liability might be based on obtain-
ing something as intangible as another’s right to exercise exclu-
sive control over the use of a party’s assets . . . [for] [w]hatever
the outer boundaries may be, the effort to characterize peti-
tioners’ actions here as an ‘obtaining of property from’ respon-
dents is well beyond them.”  The Court performed an analysis
of the statutory language.  Beginning with the common-law def-
inition of extortion according to William Blackstone, the Court
then noted that the Hobbs Act retained the requirement that
statutory language that property must be “obtained.”  Further,
“[e]liminating the requirement that property must be obtained
to constitute extortion would not only conflict with the express
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requirement of the Hobbs Act, it would also eliminate the rec-
ognized distinction between extortion and the separate crime of
coercion.”  
With this judicial history, the Court noted that it was sig-
nificant that Congress deliberately omitted coercion in the
drafting of the Hobbs Act. The Court also recognized its own
decision in United States v. Teamsters,31 in which the Court cre-
ated an exception in the Anti-Racketeering Act that Congress
decided to replace with the Hobbs Act, but still omitted coer-
cion.  The Court then resolved an apparent contradiction in its
own history.  Under United States v. Culbert,32 the Court stated
“that the words of the Hobbs Act ‘do not lend themselves to
restrictive interpretation,’” and under United States v. Enmons,33
in which the Court stated that since the Hobbs Act was a crim-
inal statute ambiguity must be resolved in favor of lenity.  To
this the Court asserts that, under McNally v. United States,34
when there are two possible interpretations of a criminal
statute, only with definite language from Congress can a court
choose the harsher interpretation.  Hence, “[i]f the distinction
between extortion and coercion, which we find controls these
cases, is to be abandoned, such a significant expansion of the
law’s coverage must come from Congress, and not from the
courts.” Addressing the issue of state extortion charges, the
Court reasons that “[b]ecause petitioners did not obtain or
attempt to obtain respondents’ property, both the state extor-
tion claims and the claim of attempting or conspiring to com-
mit state extortion were fatally flawed.”  Because all of the
predicate acts supporting the jury’s finding of a RICO violation
must be reversed, the judgment that the petitions violated
RICO must also be reversed.  
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW: NINTH CIRCUIT’S
“AUTOMATIC TERMINATION” OF A CONSPIRACY
In United States v. Jimenez Recio,35 the Court held the Ninth
Circuit was incorrect in its view that a conspiracy ends through
“defeat” when the Government intervenes and makes the con-
spiracy’s goals impossible to achieve, even if the conspirators
do not know that the Government has intervened.  On
November 18, 1997, police stopped a truck in Nevada.  They
found, and seized, a large stash of illegal drugs, and with the
help of the truck’s two drivers they set up a sting.  The
Government took the truck and the drivers to the truck’s orig-
inal destination, where the drivers engaged a contact who said
he would send someone to get the truck.  Three hours later, the
two defendants arrived at the truck’s location and drove the
truck away from the location.  Police arrested the two men.
The Ninth Circuit agreed by a panel vote of 2 to 1 that United
States v. Cruz36 was binding law.  In Cruz, the Ninth Circuit
wrote that a conspiracy terminates when “there is affirmative
evidence of abandonment, withdrawal, disavowal or defeat of
the object of the conspiracy.”  The Ninth Circuit reached this
conclusion after considering the conviction of an individual
who had joined a conspiracy to distribute drugs after the
Government had seized the
drugs.  The Circuit court found
that the Government’s seizure of
the drugs guaranteed the
“defeat” of the conspiracy’s
object, so the individual who
had joined after that point could
not be convicted of conspiracy.  
The Court began its analysis
by stating of the Ninth Circuit’s
holding that a conspiracy con-
tinues “until there is affirmative evidence of abandonment,
withdrawal, disavowal or defeat of the object of the conspir-
acy,” with the “defeat of the object” being the critical portion.
The Ninth Circuit clearly intended that the government ends a
conspiracy by stopping it even for conspirators who are totally
unaware that the government has made the object of the con-
spiracy impossible to achieve.  The Court stated that, in its
view, this is incorrect. First, the Court said the Ninth Circuit’s
conclusions were inconsistent with the “proper view of the
law.”  The Court has repeatedly stated that the essence of con-
spiracy is “an agreement to commit an unlawful act.”
Furthermore, a conspiracy agreement is “a distinct evil,” which
“may exist and be punished whether or not the substantive
crime ensues.”  Last, a “conspiracy poses a ‘threat to the pub-
lic’ over and above the threat of the commission of the relevant
substantive crime—both because the ‘combination in crime
makes more likely the commission of [other] crimes’ and
because it ‘decreases the probability that the individuals
involved will depart from their path of criminality.’”  The Court
stated “[t]hat being so, the Government’s defeat of the con-
spiracy’s objective will not necessarily and automatically ter-
minate the conspiracy.”  The Court noted that almost all
“courts and commentators” endorse the view of the Court in
its holding in this case.  
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: ANTITERRORISM AND
EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT AND CERTIFICATE OF
APPEALABILITY
In Miller-El v. Cockrell,37 the Court determined that, under
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act when a court
of appeals is considering issuing a certificate of appealability to
a habeas applicant, the court of appeals should limit its exami-
nation to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of his
claims, and the prisoner seeking the certificate of appealability
need only demonstrate “a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.”38 The Court took note of the require-
ments for the granting of a certificate of appealability, which is
necessary for a federal court of appeals to have jurisdiction to
rule on the merits of appeals from habeas petitioners:  such a
certificate can be issued only if the requirements of section
2253 have been met.  Under section 2253(c), a petitioner must
make a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
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right.”  As it did in Barefoot v.
Estelle,39 the Court deter-
mined that for a requisite
showing, the petitioner must
“show that reasonable jurists
could debate whether (or, for
that matter, agree that) the
petition should have been
resolved in a different manner
or that the issues presented
were ‘adequate to deserve
encouragement.’”  The Court
noted that “[t]his threshold
inquiry does not require full
consideration of the factual or
legal bases adduced in sup-
port of the claims.”
Furthermore, the Court
declared  that “[w]hen a court
of appeals side steps this process by first deciding the merits of
an appeal, and then justifying its denial of a [certificate of
appealability] based on its adjudication of the actual merits, it
is in essence deciding an appeal without jurisdiction.”
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: 28 U.S.C. SECTION 2254(D)
In Price v. Vincent,40 a unanimous Court held a habeas peti-
tioner whose claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court
was not entitled to relief in a federal court unless he meets the
requirements of 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d).  Respondent filed a
habeas petition under section 2254(d), which included a dou-
ble jeopardy claim that rested on the same facts presented in his
state court appeal.  The Court concluded, therefore, he was not
entitled to review unless he could demonstrate the state court’s
adjudication of his claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”  A state
court’s decision is only “‘contrary to’ our clearly established law
if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth
in our cases’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially
indistinguishable from a decision of the Court and nevertheless
arrives at a result different from our precedent.’”  Additionally,
the state court’s decision is only “an unreasonable application of
clearly established law” if “the state court applied [that case] to
the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.”  In
this case, the Court said neither had occurred.    
HABEAS CORPUS: INEFFECTIVE-ASSISTANCE-OF-
COUNSEL CLAIMS
In Massaro v. United States,41 Justice Kennedy delivered the
opinion for a unanimous Court. Here, the Court held that an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim may be brought in a
collateral proceeding under section 2255, regardless of
whether the petitioner could have raised the claim on direct
appeal. The Court began its analysis by noting that under
United States v. Frady42 and Bousley v. United States,43 “claims
not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on collateral
review unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice.”
However, the “procedural default rule is neither a statutory nor
a constitutional requirement, but it is a doctrine adhered to by
the courts to conserve judicial resources and to respect the
law’s important interests in the finality of judgments.”  The
Court reasoned that by requiring ineffectiveness-of-counsel
claims be lodged on direct appeal, it would be forcing the
claimant to raise the issue before there has been an opportu-
nity to fully develop the factual predicate, and it would be a
forum not best suited to asses the facts: “When an ineffective-
assistance claim is brought on direct appeal, appellate counsel
and the court must proceed on a trial record not developed
precisely for the object of litigating or preserving the claim and
thus often incomplete or inadequate for this purpose.”  
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL
Addressing the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in
Woodford v. Visciotti,44 the Court found that the California
Supreme Court did not err in its application of Strickland v.
Washington,45 and also correctly applied the “unreasonable
application clause” of 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d).  The
California Supreme Court did not dispute that respondent’s
counsel was constitutionally inadequate during the sentenc-
ing phase, but concluded that it did not prejudice the jury’s
sentencing decision.  In Strickland, the Court held that to
prove prejudice the defendant must establish a “reasonable
probability” that, but for the counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.  It also
specifically rejected the proposition that the defendant had to
prove it more likely than not that the outcome would have
been altered.  
In determining that the California Supreme Court erred in
its application of Strickland, the Ninth Circuit read the
California court’s opinion as applying the latter test—requiring
respondent to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that the
result of the sentencing proceeding would have been different.
The Court noted that the state supreme court “painstakingly”
cited and applied Strickland, but that the Ninth Circuit fixed
on three occasions where the state court shortened the phrase
“reasonably probable” to “probable” without the modifier.  The
Court concluded, “Its occasional shorthand reference to that
standard by use of the term ‘probable’ without the modifier
may perhaps be imprecise, but if so, it can no more be consid-
ered a repudiation of the standard than can this Court’s own
occasional indulgence in the same imprecision.”  The Ninth
Circuit also concluded that the state court’s determination that
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respondent suffered no prejudice was “objectively unreason-
able.”  To this assertion, the Court responded that in its opin-
ion, the Ninth Circuit ruled contrary to the standard set out in
28 U.S.C. section 2254(d).  The Court concluded that the
Ninth Circuit substituted its own judgment for the state court’s
judgment by ignoring the crucial distinction between “an
unreasonable application of federal law” from an “incorrect
application of federal law.”    
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: SECTION 2254(A)
In Early v. Packer,46 a per curiam decision, the Court
reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit granting a petition
for a writ habeas corpus, under 28 U.S.C. section 2254(a), as
incorrect on the grounds that the court of appeals wrongly con-
cluded that the state court’s decision contradicted federal law.
The petitioner filed for a writ after conviction in state court,
alleging the trial judge improperly instructed the jury by urg-
ing the jury to assess the facts and apply them to the law as he
stated it and asking for a count of the jury, which resulted in an
11 to 1 tally.  The Court first concluded that, contrary to the
Ninth Circuit’s opinion, it was not necessary for a state court to
cite to federal precedent in its decision.  Second, it also con-
cluded that the state court did not improperly apply the total-
ity of circumstances test set forth in Lowenfield v. Phelps.47
Finally, the Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit improperly
relied on Jenkins v. United States48 and United States v. United
States Gypsum Co.,49 which the Ninth Circuit interpreted to
protect a defendant from the trial court urging jurors to reach
any verdict, not just protecting him from a trial court urging a
particular type of verdict.  The Court responded that “[n]either
Jenkins nor Gypsum Co. is relevant to the § 2254(d)(1) deter-
mination, since neither case sets forth a rule applying to state-
court proceedings.”  The Court found that both cases reversed
convictions based on jury instructions given in federal prose-
cutions, and that “neither opinion purported to interpret any
provision of the Constitution. . . . [so that] the Ninth Circuit
erred by relying on those nonconstitutional decisions.”
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
Seeking to secure uniformity among the circuit courts, a
unanimous Court, in Clay v. United States,50 held that for the
purpose of 28 U.S.C. section 2255’s one-year limitation period,
a judgment of conviction becomes final when the time expires
for filing a petition for certiorari.  Justice Ginsburg, writing for
the Court, said, “Because ‘we presume that Congress expects
its statutes to be read in conformity with this Court’s prece-
dents,’51 our unvarying understanding of finality for collateral
review purposes would ordinarily determine the meaning of
‘becomes final’ in § 2255.”  According to precedent, “Finality
attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on
direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or
when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires. . . .”
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Professor of Law at the University of Southern
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University of Virginia School of Law from 1968
to 1981.  He is found on the web at
http://www.rcf.usc.edu/~cwhitebr/.    Professor Whitebread grate-
fully acknowledges the help of his research assistants, William
Dentino and Heather Manolakas.
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T H E  J O U R N A L  O F  T H E  A M E R I C A N  J U D G E S  A S S O C I A T I O N
Court Review, the quarterly journal
of the American Judges Association,
seeks to provide practical, useful infor-
mation to the working judges of the
United States, Canada, and Mexico. In each
issue, we hope to provide information that
will be of use to judges in their everyday work,
whether in highlighting new procedures or
methods of trial, court, or case management, pro-
viding substantive information regarding an area of
law likely to encountered by many judges, or by pro-
viding background information (such as psychology or
other social science research) that can be used by judges
in their work.
Court Review is indexed in the Current Law Index, the
Legal Resource Index, and LegalTrac.
Court Review invites the submission of unsolicited, original
articles, essays, book reviews, and letters to the editor.
Submissions and inquiries may be sent to Court Review’s editor:
Judge Steve Leben, 100 North Kansas Avenue, Olathe, Kansas 66061,
e-mail address: sleben@ix.netcom.com.   Comments and suggestions
for the publication, not intended for publication, also are welcome.
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American Judges
Association, invites the submission of unsolicited, original articles,
essays, and book reviews.  Court Review seeks to provide practical,
useful information to the working judges of the United States.  In
each issue, we hope to provide information that will be of use to
judges in their everyday work, whether in highlighting new proce-
dures or methods of trial, court, or case management, providing sub-
stantive information regarding an area of law likely to encountered
by many judges, or by providing background information (such as
psychology or other social science research) that can be used by
judges in their work.
Court Review is received by the 2,500 members of the American
Judges Association (AJA), as well as many law libraries.  About 40
percent of the members of the AJA are general jurisdiction, state trial
judges.  Another 40 percent are limited jurisdiction judges, includ-
ing municipal court and other specialized court judges.  The
remainder include federal trial judges, state and federal appellate
judges, and administrative law judges.
Articles:  Articles should be submitted in double-spaced text, with
citations in footnotes, in either Word or WordPerfect format.  The
suggested article length for Court Review is between 18 and 36 pages
of double-spaced text (including the footnotes).  Footnotes should
conform to the 17th edition of The Bluebook:  A Uniform System of
Citation.  Articles should be of a quality consistent with better state
bar association law journals and/or other law reviews.
Essays:  Essays should be submitted in the same format as articles.
Suggested length is between 6 and 12 pages of double-spaced text
(including any footnotes).
Book Reviews:  Book reviews should be submitted in the same for-
mat as articles.  Suggested length is between 3 and 9 pages of dou-
ble-spaced text (including any footnotes).
Pre-commitment:  For previously published authors, we will con-
sider making a tentative publication commitment based upon an
article outline.  In addition to the outline, a comment about the spe-
cific ways in which the submission will be useful to judges and/or
advance scholarly discourse on the subject matter would be appreci-
ated.  Final acceptance for publication cannot be given until a com-
pleted article, essay, or book review has been received and reviewed
by the Court Review editor or board of editors.
Editing: Court Review reserves the right to edit all manuscripts.  
Submission:  Submissions may be made either by mail or e-mail.
Please send them to Court Review’s editor:  Judge Steve Leben, 100
North Kansas Avenue, Olathe, Kansas 66061, e-mail address:
sleben@ix.netcom.com, (913) 715-3822.  Submissions will be
acknowledged by mail; letters of acceptance or rejection will be sent
following review.
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2004 Annual Conference
San Francisco, California
October 24-29
Grand Hyatt San Francisco
$159.00 single/double
2005 Midyear Meeting
Sanibel Island, Florida
May 12-14
Sundial Beach Resort
$125.00 single/double
2005 Annual Conference
Anchorage, Alaska
September 18-23
Hotel Captain Cook
$135.00 single/double
2006 Midyear Meeting
Coeur d’Alene, Idaho
May 18-20
Coeur d’Alene Resort
$130 deluxe room; 
$160 premier room
2006 Annual Meeting
New Orleans, Louisiana
Hotel Monteleone
$169 single/double
2007 Midyear Meeting
Newport, Rhode Island
2007 Annual Conference
Vancouver, British Columbia
FUTURE AJA 
CONFERENCES
COMING SOON . . .
2004 AJA MEMBERSHIP
CAMPAIGN
WATCH FOR INFORMATION IN THE SUMMER 2004
ISSUE OF BENCHMARK AND IN YOUR MAIL.
NOTICE
As of July 1, 2004, the American Judges Association 
is suspending all prior programs under which a 
first-year membership was provided without charge.
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NEW BOOKS
JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY:
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE
COURTS.  BRUCE J. WINICK & DAVID B.
WEXLER, EDS.  Carolina Academic Press,
2003 ($45).  352 pp.
Professors David Wexler and Bruce
Winick have provided the intellectual
framework for problem-solving courts
with what they coined “therapeutic
jurisprudence.”  They have collected a
well-balanced set of articles exploring
how principles of therapeutic jurispru-
dence have been applied in the courts in
this book.
As Wexler and Winick note, the U.S.
Conference of Chief Justices (CCJ) and
Conference of State Court Administrators
(COSCA) adopted a resolution in 2000
endorsing “broad integration over the next
decade of the principles and methods
employed in the problem-solving courts
into the administration of justice to
improve court processes and outcomes
while preserving the rule of law, enhancing
judicial effectiveness, and meeting the
needs and expectations of litigants, victims
and the community.”  This book helps to
set out both the general principles and
their application in a variety of contexts.
Separate chapters explore drug courts,
domestic-violence courts, mental-health
courts, youth courts, and re-entry courts.
Articles examine how to use sentencing
powers to reduce recidivism, how domes-
tic-violence court judges can be effective
as risk managers, and how to apply the
principles of therapeutic jurisprudence to
the appellate courts.
Wexler and Winick have perhaps been
more aggressive in promoting scholarship
in the discipline they have created—ther-
apeutic jurisprudence—than anyone else
in the history of legal scholarship.
Literally hundreds of articles are in print,
and many of them were specifically
recruited or encouraged by Wexler or
Winick or both.  In this book, they have
collected some of the best, emphasizing
those that would be of practical help to
judges trying to explore or apply these
principles.  They also include some of
their own essays, and a thorough listing
of other references.
The CCJ/COSCA resolution encourag-
ing the broad use of these principles indi-
cates widespread interest and potential.
This book will help that potential to be
realized.  
o
E-NEWSLETTER ON
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS
The National Center for State Courts
has a new, quarterly electronic newsletter
on problem-solving courts.  Called
Problem-Solving Reporter, the quarterly
newsletter tracks how courts are using
problem-solving or therapeutic jurispru-
dence methods. 
The first issue of Problem-Solving
Reporter focuses on DUI courts.  A brief
summary of a comprehensive study of the
effectiveness of the court system in han-
dling hard-core drunk drivers in
Colorado indicates several problems,
tracking some of those listed in the article
in this issue by Robyn Robertson and
Herb Simpson (see page 8).  There is also
a more detailed review of the Anchorage,
Alaska, wellness court, which has imple-
mented drug-court principles in the han-
dling of DUI offenders.  In an interview,
District Judge James Wanamaker of
Anchorage provides a detailed review of
conditions he places on offenders, includ-
ing the use of Naltrexone, a drug that
reduces cravings for alcohol.
OTHER E-NEWSLETTERS
The National Center for State Courts
has seven other e-newsletters which you
can sign up for at http://www.
ncsconline.org/Newsletters/NCSC_
newsletters.htm.:
• Jur-E Bulletin, a newsletter concerning
jury management;
• The Public Trust, about initiatives that
may help to increase public trust and
confidence in the judiciary;
• Family Violence Forum, on judicial
actions to reduce family violence;
• Federal Funding Report, a newsletter
with tips and strategies courts can use
to obtain federal or private grants;
• Center Court, providing general news
for the state-courts community;
• International Program Brief, which
covers international justice issues; and
• Mark Your Calendar, which provides
information about events and stories
of potential interest.
PROPOSED REVISIONS TO
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
The American Bar Association’s Joint
Commission to Evaluate the Model Code
of Judicial Conduct has published a pre-
liminary draft of revised Canons 1 and 2
to the Code.  Those drafts are available
for review at http://www.abanet.org/
judicialethics/drafts.html. 
Judges involved in problem-solving
courts may want to review the proposals
and provide suggestions to the
Commission.  A May 11, 2004 memo
from Mark Harrison, chair of the
Commission, specifically invites public
comment in this area:
[M]any persons appearing before the
Commission, as well as Commission
members, have concerns that the
present draft (and the present Model
Code) does not address sufficiently
certain types of communications
that are encouraged or required of a
judge in the course of his or her ser-
vice on “specialized courts,” such as
drug courts, domestic abuse courts,
etc.  Comments on this subject from
judges and others who are knowl-
edgeable about the operations of
specialized courts will be greatly
appreciated.
Comments and suggestions regarding
these drafts are being accepted until July
15, 2004.  The preferred means of com-
ment is by e-mail to ABA staff member
Eileen Gallagher at gallaghE@staff.
abanet.org.  Comments may also be sent
mail to Ms. Gallagher at 321 N. Clark
Street, Chicago, Illinois 60610.
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